Shocks emanating from and propagating through the banking system have recently gained interest in the macroeconomics literature, yet they are not a feature unique to the 2008/09 financial crisis. Banking disintermediation shocks occured frequently during the Great Inflation era due to fixed deposit rate ceilings. I estimate the effect of deposit rate ceilings inscribed in Regulation Q on the transmission of federal funds rate changes to bank level credit growth using a historic bank level data set spanning half a century from 1959 to 2013 with about two million observations. Measures of the degree of bindingness of Regulation Q suggest that individual banks' lending growth was smaller the more binding the legally fixed rate ceiling. Interaction terms with monetary policy suggest that the policy impact on bank level credit growth was non-linear at the ceiling "kink" and significantly larger when rate ceilings were in place. At the bank level, short-term interest rates exceeding the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings identify bank loan supply shifts that disappeared with deposit rate deregulation and thus weakened the credit channel of monetary transmission since the early 1980s.
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"All the legislative proposals need to be judged first of all against the central objective:
We need to strengthen our ability to implement monetary policy in a variety of possible circumstances..."
-Paul Volcker (1979) Statement to Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Inflation, Disintermediation and the Lending Channel
The financial crisis of 2008/2009 and the accompanying credit squeeze triggered a number of papers in macroeconomics that examine the importance of financial intermediation and credit frictions for output fluctuations, see, for example, Curdia and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2010) , Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) or Gertler and Kiyotaki (2013) , some building on earlier work by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) . Yet, disintermediation shocks emanating from the banking sector were prevalent long prior to the recent financial crisis and are not confined to "rare disasters" (Barro, 2006) like the Great Depression and the Great Recession. I show that disintermediation shocks were prevalent at business cycle frequency during the Great Inflation due to an interaction of elevated inflation induced high nominal rates and nominally fixed deposit interest rate ceilings. I provide bank level evidence on the effects of deposit rate ceilings engrained in Regulation Q, and on how these effects differ by bank characteristics like bank size, capitalization or liquidity position.
These findings have important implications. If policy makers at the time had been aware of those disintermediation wedges, then there would have been a rationale for monetary policy responses during the Great Inflation period more muted than prescriptions derived from variants of Taylor (1993) and Orphanides (2003) type rules that focussed on (forecasted) output and inflation gaps. My findings suggest a broader historical interpretation of recent macroeconomic models designed to capture features of the recent crisis that include policy makers' responses to disintermediation shocks like Curdia and Woodford (2010) . More generally, the micro evidence presented here casts doubt on output and inflation gaps being sufficient statistics for macroeconomic imbalances. Finally, heterogeneity in the impact across the bank size dimension empirically supports Lucas' (2013) claim that Regulation Q and the financial innovation it set off induced the growth of the shadow banking sector.
To illustrate the effect of the regulation, consider the constraints imposed by legally fixed deposit rate ceilings in figure 1 on the asset-liability interaction on banks balance sheets (see table 1 ). When short-term interest rates exceeded the legally binding ceiling, depositors have an incentive to move out of deposits at this "kink", say, into state savings bonds. This made it difficult for U.S. commercial banks to maintain their current levels of lending unless they were able to costlessly substitute the outflow of deposit funds by other means such as issuing bonds, notes or equity. This induced credit crunches. Figure 2 shows how the expected negative co-movements between core deposits and other managed liabilities, primarily time deposits also subject to the rate ceilings, only turned negative, thus sheltering credit by offsetting core deposit outflows, from the early 1980s. The positive co-movement induced by binding ceilings is only a feature of the Great Inflation era. . I also examine how the impact of deposit rate deregulation varies across bank level proxies for financial constraints such as bank size, liquidity and capitalization that are traditionally employed in the lending channel literature to identify policy induced loan supply shifts.
This paper relates to the bank level credit channel literature, macroeconomic studies of changes in the policy transmission mechanism and the emergence of the shadow banking sector. First, I extend a number of important empirical studies on the credit channel Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Ashcraft, 2006) in method and sample time coverage.
Second, I provide microeconomic bank level context to macroeconomic and sectoral studies exploring the effects of deposit deregulation either using aggregate data, for example analyzing the structural change in the interest rate sensitivity of GDP due to disintermediation (Duca, 1995; Duca, 1998; Mertens, 2008; Duca and Wu, 2009 ), or sectoral data, for instance examining the effects of deregulation on housing (Duca, 1996) . My analysis corroborates VAR and DSGE based evidence on deposit deregulation by Mertens (2008) by an institution based panel analysis. In their handbook chapter, Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) point out that "changes at the macroeconomic level are difficult to detect. Relatively unrestricted approaches using macroeconomic data, such as analyses using VARs, suffer from the curse of dimensionality and have reached different conclusions regarding the importance of time variation in the links between monetary policy and macroeconomic activity; more restricted structural approaches are more controversial." The panel method employed in this paper yields insights on detectable changes in the credit channel which may help inform macroeconomic models.
Third, the shadow banking sector and reinterpretations of the core function and uniqueness of banks has recently gained the attention of policy makers and academics alike, see Stein (2012); Gorton and Metrick (2011); Dang, Gorton, Holmström, and Ordoñez (2014) ; Hanson, Shleifer, Stein, and Vishny (2014) . In his requiem for the Glass-Steagall Act Lucas (2013) points to Regulation Q as one of the two defects of the Banking Act of 1933. He emphasizes that Regulation Q triggered the development of deposit substitutes, like Eurodollars, money market deposit accounts, and sweeps, that "are simple work-arounds designed to evade the restrictions imposed by Regulation Q" (Lucas, 2013) . The measure of bindingness of rate ceilings employed in my estimates incorporates adjustments for financial innovation, yet, I still find significant differences in bank level credit growth responses across the bank size dimension indicating that larger banks, that were in a better position to offer non-deposit alternatives to their depositors, were less affected.
I highlight three contributions to the empirical bank level analysis of monetary transmission through the credit channel: (i) The compilation of a unique and novel historic bank level data set covering the whole population of U.S. commercial banks for more than half a century at quarterly frequency, (ii) the identification of the loan supply shifts induced by interactions between inflation and deposit rate ceilings, and (iii) more realistic, less restrictive assumptions about the heterogeneity in cyclical loan demand facing individual banks.
A Novel Historical Bank Level Data Set (1959 -2013)
First, I compile a bank level data set from original reporting forms with historic coverage ranging over more than half a century. Beyond consistently backdating the data set to the late 1950s, I also update the data to include the most recently available quarterly observations up to the fourth quarter of 2013. Most previous bank level studies focus on single events, one or two interest rate cycles and the earliest start in the late 1970s (figure 4). It is worthwhile emphasizing the uniqueness of this historic entity level data set since in studying aggregate activity, economists commonly rely on aggregate data for longer time horizons. Entity level data on economic actors other than financial intermediaries like households and firms have only been available recently and not consistently or at quarterly frequency. In terms of historical and cross-section coverage, sample frequency, and data consistency, the bank level data set underlying the analysis has potential to help us understand business cycles and monetary transmission if financial frictions pertain to those cyclical fluctuations.
Estimating Financial Disintermediation Due to Regulation Q
Second, Frame and White (2004) point to a lack of empirical backing on the effects of financial innovation and the accompanying deregulation. I refine our understanding of the effects of deregulation by including controls for the bindingness of Regulation Q in bank level lending regressions, thus empirically capturing the effects of deposit deregulation at the bank level.
Figure 4 displays a time-series of the difference between short-term interest rates and the legally fixed deposit rate ceilings for commercial banks. Note the sample overlap with previous empirical bank level studies on the lending channel. Also notice how the data underlying the analysis of these papers hardly overlap with the data covered by the aggregate evidence on the lending channel by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) . Regulation Q provides a time-varying constraint on the lending behaviour of banks that was removed by liberalization. It would be realistic to assume that individual households or businesses applying for loans from commercial banks would not be directly affected by this additional constraint on bank behavior, insofar as their idiosyncratic loan demand is concerned. Thus, the bindingness of Regulation Q can be interpreted as a first-order shifter of bank level loan supply. Given the challenges in the bank level literature to identify loan supply shifts, this is a valuable contribution.
Interest rate ceilings in the U.S. date back to the Banking Act of 1933, but were not binding for the first three decades of their existence (Gilbert, 1986 This regulation was justified by three arguments: First, excessive interest rate competition contributed to financial instability, because the higher the interest rate paid on deposits, the higher the cost of doing business to the banker and thus the lower bank profitability. Second, it was argued that banks, due to competitive pressures, were forced to pay higher deposit rates and would be induced to seek riskier investments and make high risk loans in order to recoup the higher interest rate costs. A third and final argument was that the deposit interest rate ceiling would compensate banks for the costs incurred by the newly introduced compulsory deposit insurance premiums (Gilbert, 1986) . Q ceiling on large time deposits and, in the summer, the market interest rate rose above the regulated rate for both long-and short-term certificates of deposit (CDs). My estimates support this narrative and reveal that the abolition of regulatory ceilings caused a significant muting in the transmission of monetary policy through credit.
Accounting for Loan Demand Heterogeneity
Third, as a contribution to the bank lending channel literature, I allow for banks to face different cyclical loan demand variations. I explicitly control for differences in the sensitivity of credit growth among banks of different sizes, liquidity positions, and capitalization to macroeconomic factors other than monetary policy, thus capturing heterogeneity in loan demand facing different banks. Consider figure 5 that plots cross-sectional percentiles of year-over-year bank level credit growth. If you focus on the shading around the median (50th percentile) highlighted in white you will find that when lending growth is relatively high, there is more dispersion above the median. When lending growth is relatively low, there is more dispersion below the whitened median. This indicates meaningful heterogeneity in the cyclical lending behavior of individual banks that my specification captures by also interacting non-policy macrofactors with bank level characteristics.
2 Credit Supply, Regulation Q and the Great Moderation
Identifying Credit Supply Shifts in the Empirical Literature
Classic interest rate channels suggests that monetary policy affects the macroeconomy via portfolio shifts that induce asset price changes, altering households' consumption and firms' investment decisions via inter-(e.g. through interest rates) and intratemporal (e.g. through exchange rates) substitution. Over and beyond these "price" channels, credit channels are operative (figure 8). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) estimate VARs using aggregate data from 1959 to 1978 to find that after a policy contraction, bank loans only respond after half a year and do not adjust completely for over two years (see figure 9) . Such results are consistent with both a price channel and a credit channel, given that real activity also takes about two years to fully adjust.
The time period Bernanke and Blinder (1992) Given that aggregate data records aggregates of equilibrium outcomes rather than identifying loan demand and supply shifts, the empirical literature has moved on to exploit the underlying heterogeneity. Studies attempted to identify credit supply changes by estimating differences in lending growth responses to monetary policy across bank level proxies for financial constraints. These financial constraints range from size and liquidity to capitalization and membership in a bank holding company (Ashcraft, 2006) .
The seminal paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000) Building on Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Kishan and Opiela (2000) , Ashcraft (2006) uses membership in a multi-bank holding company in order to identify shifts in loan supply from shifts in loan demand. He also controls for heterogeneity in the loan demands facing individual banks by interacting bank characteristics and non-policy macroeconomic factors. Ashcraft (2006) contrasts the response of stand-alone banks and banks affiliated with a multibank holding company, finding that the lending of multibank holding companies is less responsive to monetary policy, and that stand-alone banks have the strongest lending growth responses to monetary policy. In more recent contributions, Jonas and King (2008) examine the relationship between a bank's efficiency and its responsiveness to monetary policy. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) examine the international exposure of banks and their lending dynamics. Interesting recent approaches combine loan level data with bank balance sheet data (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina Salas, 2012; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina Salas, 2014, Forthcoming) or bank level responses to SLOOS, the senior loan officer opinion survey (Bassett, Chosak, Driscoll, and Zakrajšek, 2014) , but such data is unavailable for the historic sample period and question considered in this paper.
Political Economy of Regulation Q
Deregulation is clearly endogenous to the economic environment. A number of papers examine the political economy of Regulation Q. Timberlake (1985) analyses the political economy of the DIDMCA and its subsections. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) also address political economy issues by investigating the differential impact of the passage of DIDMCA on three portfolios of different depository institutions FRS banks, non-FRS banks, and Savings and Loans using intervention analysis and financial market data. Whilst many regulatory changes are endogenous, my paper does not attempt to explain deregulation by looking at the process that brought it about as in Timberlake (1985) or at its distributional repercussions as in Allen and Wilhelm (1988) . Rather, I treat deregulation as a given and examine the impact of the time variation in its bindingness driven by nominal rates on the lending behavior of commercial banks.
Regulation Q, Monetary Transmission and the Great Moderation
Most advanced economies have experienced a striking decline in the volatility of aggregate economic activity since the early 1980s as illustrated in figure 7 . Volatility reductions are evident for output and employment at the aggregate level and across most industrial sectors and expenditure categories. Inflation and inflation volatility have also declined dramatically.
Whilst the sources of the "Great Moderation" (Bernanke, 2004) are still debated, surveys like Stock and Watson (2002) put forward three nonexclusive explanations for "the long and large decline in US output volatility" (Blanchard and Simon, 2001) .
One interpretation of the Great Moderation is to consider it as a marked reduction in the variance of exogenous structural shocks ("good luck"). A second set of explanations focusses on structural changes in the economy like innovations in financial market that facilitate intertemporal smoothing of consumption and investment (Blanchard and Simon, 2001 ), better inventory management through information technology (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros, 2001 ) and the marked shift in output from goods to services (Burns, 1960; Moore and Zarnowitz, 1987) . The third and final set of explanation centers around improved policy ("good policy") and, in particular, monetary policy (Taylor, 1999; Cogley and Sargent, 2001) .
Previous aggregate sector studies like Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) 
Data

Individual Bank Level Data
The source for all bank-level variables is the "call" Reports of Condition and Income ( The variables used in the estimates below are total loans, bank size as measured by assets, the cash-assets ratio, the securities-asset ratio and capitalization as measured by the capitalasset ratio. The ratios are demeaned and normalized by one standard deviation. Furthermore, show the end of quarter dates, which is the due date for the reports post 1975. The bank level data is generated here by linear interpolation as illustrated in 10a. The key assumption here is that the bank level measurement error between the interpolated path and the actual realized, yet unmeasured, path is not systematically related to any other regressors included in the empirical specification. Panels 6b, 6c, and 6d of figure 6 focus on subperiods to illustrate the interpolation exercise more clearly.
You can also see in panels 6b, 6c, and 6d that for some cases the timing of the call report dates in the earlier period do not exactly coincide with the end of quarter as in the most recent three decades. The first quarter of 1960 is a good example of that. In the period prior to 1975, the reports were "called" from the commercial banks at specific dates to avoid situations like (in)famous Repo 105 at Lehman Brothers Inc, hence the term "call" reports. Most of the "called" dates coincide with the end of the quarter. Yet, for some of the dates we need to make another assumption that is illustrated in figure 10b . As in the case of interpolation there is measurement error. The assumption here, again, is that this measurement error is not systematically related to other bank level regressors in the empirical specifications. Furthermore, it is assumed the period denoted ∆t illustrated in figure 10b does not contain meaningful aggregate shocks that correlate with the macroeconomic controls.
Macroeconomic Data
In 
Effective Bindingness of Regulation Q
The abolition of Regulation Q was part of the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA). For further details, I refer to Friedman (1970); Ruebling (1970) ; Cook (1978) ; Allen and Wilhelm (1988) ; Gilbert and Lovati (1979) ; Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) and the more recent treatment by Mertens (2008) . The DIDMCA phased out government-imposed interest rate ceilings on banks and other institutions. Prior to the passing of DIDMCA, Regulation Q limited the rate of interest that could be paid by banks on time deposits. Figure 1 shows the evolution of 3-month treasury rates and the binding Regulation Q ceilings.
The measurement of the bindingness of Regulation Q requires a brief discussion of marketbased deposit substitutes. There were two types of partially regulated deposits prior to 1983:
small-saver certificates (SSCs) and money market certificates (MMCs). Table 9 , adopted from Gilbert (1986, p. 31) , highlights the steps pertaining to SSCs and MMCs in the phasing-out of Regulation Q. MMCs had a high minimum requirement of $10,000. I follow the treatment in Duca (1995) in that I use a financial-innovation adjusted Regulation Q bindingness measure, that takes into account rate differentials relevant for SSCs, which (i) in terms of their lot size ($500 to $1,000) were closer to core deposits and (ii) in terms of their maturity structure (2 to 4 years) were more relevant to funding mortgages. In the early part of the sample the measure of bindingness (RegQ t ) is the difference between the three month treasury rate and the legally fixed interest rate ceiling. In the later sample period it is the relevant rate for the respective substitute (SSCs) above the legally prescribed limit (see Duca, 1995, for details) . Figure 4 displays the Regulation Q bindingness indicator (RegQ t ). Due to the financial innovation adjustment the bindingness measure is muted during the regulatory phase-out compared to a "naive", non-financial innovation adjusted Regulation Q measure, that is the difference between the "formal" price ceiling and the 3-month treasury rate depicted in figure   1 .
Empirical Specification and Hypotheses
In this section I first describe the baseline empirical models in detail. I then explain how the baseline specification (1) is augmented to include the proxy of the bindingness of Regulation Q and its effect on monetary transmission to credit.
Baseline Specification
Following the empirical literature on the lending channel, the baseline specification (1) without controlling for deposit deregulation is
So four quarter bank level credit growth is regressed on a constant, its own lags ∆L i (throughout the paper lags are indexed by the letter ), macroeconomic controls M, bank characteristics B i , interactions between bank characteristics and macroeconomic controls and other controls, including entity specific seasonals. Boschen and Mills (1991) ; Boschen and Mills (1995) , Strongin (1995) , and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) . Bluedorn, Bowdler, and Koch (2014) estimate the impact of an augmented Romer and Romer (2004) In order to deal with other exceptional movements in the data, I follow Ashcraft (2006) in fitting all regressions by OLS for the largest possible sample and then eliminating outliers.
These are defined as observations for which the absolute DFITS statistic (the scaled difference between the fitted values for the n th observation when the regression is fitted with and without the n th observation) exceeds the threshold 2 K N , where K is the total number of explanatory variables and N is the overall sample size (Welsch and Kuh, 1977) . Standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level.
Regulatory Controls in Levels
Now in order to estimate Regulation Q loan supply effects at the bank level, the baseline specification (1) will be augmented by including the Regulation Q bindingness proxy (RegQ t ) in levels:
Naturally, the measure of financial disintermediation RegQ t is exogenous to each individual bank in the sample in the same way that macroeconomic controls like prices or real growth are exogenous to each bank level observation. When short-term interest rates move above the legally fixed regulatory deposit interest rate ceiling, depositors will substitute their deposit holdings and allocate their funds to other non-regulated assets. This shrinks the funding base of individual banks and if it is not possible to replace the outflow of deposits with other funds without frictions, e.g. by issuing equity or debt, then the excess of short-term rates over the legally fixed maximum rate will act as a credit supply shifter at the bank level. Thus, the null hypothesis regarding the impact financial disintermediation due to Regulation Q at the bank level is
A rejection of the null implies a direct impact of Regulation Q at the bank level suggesting banks effectively faced different constraints under Regulation Q than they have faced since its phasing out. The estimated coefficients will help us determine the magnitude and economic significance of these constraints.
The Regulation Q proxy is also interacted with the individual bank level characteristics in order to check whether this additional constraint was binding to varying degrees for different banks.
= 0 with k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (Heterogeneity in Regulatory Impact) This is to account for the possibility, for instance, that larger banks (i.e. k = 1) were better able to evade Regulation Q because they were closer to the innovation frontier offering their clients alternatives to regulated deposits.
Regulatory Controls and Monetary Policy
We are also interested in how these additional bank level constraints impacted the transmission of monetary policy to bank level credit growth. Thus, I augment specification (1) by interaction effects of the bindingness of deregulation (RegQ t ) and monetary policy in specification (3):
This specification tests how lending growth is affected by monetary policy when Regulation Q was binding. The respective null hypothesis is:
That is the monetary policy impact on bank level credit growth is invariant to the bindingness of Regulation Q. What is the interpretation of that? The interaction is basically meant to capture the "kink" in the households optimization problem. At this kink, the incentives to move out of deposits in other asset classes increases. Narratives and adverts of the time suggest that commercial banks and thrifts pursued depositors using non-monetary rewards like toasters to induce them to keep or increase their deposit balances with their depository.
Estimates of the overall impact of monetary policy on lending growth can be obtained by testing
Further estimates of how financial disintermediation impacted monetary policy transmission vary across different types of banks, that is, hypotheses regarding pol inter k, will be discussed in detail in sections 5.2 to 5.3.
Third, I combine both the level (2) and the interaction specification (3) in a single empirical model (4):
Estimated Credit Growth Responses
I present and discuss the baseline estimation results before moving on to analyzing how the impact of deregulation varies across banks with different characteristics.
Deposit Rate Ceilings as Bank Level Credit Supply Shifters
Estimation results for the baseline regression (1) and the three empirical models (2), (3) and (4) estimate of 1984 Q1." (Stock and Watson, 2002, p. 161) Furthermore, this interpretation is also in line with a number of other recent empirical pa-pers using aggregate data. Galí and Gambetti (2009) Rows (5) and (6) give estimates of the impact of non-policy macroeconomic aggregates.
Credit growth at the bank level is procyclical with regards to real and nominal factors. For example, every thing else being equal, a one percentage point increase in real GDP increases bank level lending growth by between 0.08 and 0.10 percentage points. A one percent increase in the core price level measured by one percent change in the core PCE price index significantly increases lending growth by between 0.07 and 0.14 percentage points. The dependent variable, bank level lending growth, is measured in nominal terms. Row (7) displays the estimates of the direct impact of the binary dummy that is zero during the Great Moderation and unity prior to the Great Moderation. Mean nominal lending had been 1.47 and 1.75 percentage points greater prior to the Great Moderation. Row (8) reports estimates of the interaction between the binary Great Moderation and monetary policy. Note the switch in sign once the specification takes into account the bindingness of the deposit rate ceilings. So the structural change in the transmission of policy to bank level credit decisions is unlikely to be caused by the Great Moderation itself, but driven by the evaporation of an important loan supply shifter due to financial liberalization.
The regressions estimate the impact of federal funds rate changes on observable equilibrium lending growth, rather than on loan supply. It could be argued that the greater responsiveness of equilibrium lending growth in the earlier sample period when Regulation Q was binding may result from a higher interest rate sensitivity of loan demand, although the GMod t variable will take care of that. Similarly sized shifts in loan supply (potentially policy induced through to the bank level financial frictions) will lead to estimates of much larger lending growth responses when faced with a loan demand curve that is more sensitive to interest rate changes.
A flatter loan demand schedule due to a higher interest rate sensitivity results in greater shifts in equilibrium lending when faced with similarly sized shifts in loan supply. However, access to credit and the competition between suppliers of credit has widened substantially over the last decades rather than narrowed. Thus, it is more plausible that the loan demand sensitivity has increased rather than decreased since Regulation Q was abolished. Thus quantitatively the estimates provided here underestimate rather than overestimate the relative importance of financial disintermediation shocks as supply shifters. Becketti and Morris (1992) argue that this is true: A contemporaneous rise in financial innovation means that the demand for loans becomes flatter because the number of other available financing alternatives increases. Therefore, a contemporaneous rise in financial innovations makes it more likely that the interest rate sensitivity of loan demand for bank loans has become larger given the entry of a number of non-bank financial firms and the variety of financial products that has come to the market in recent decades. So the argument that loan demand was more sensitive to interest rates during Regulation Q when compared to the recent period seems implausible. Furthermore, my main argument is that the legislative changes controlled for here most directly affected banks rather than households or firms and their finance requirements.
To summarize, given the non-experimental nature of the data analyzed in this paper, while it is possible that other simultaneous, non-accounted for, events increased the interest rate sensitivity of loan demand until deposit interest rate deregulation was fully implemented and decreased it substantially during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, it seems rather implausible. This suggests that the impact of deregulation is primarily on the diminished ability of the Federal
Reserve to directly shift loan supply schedules of individual banks, implying that the lending channel is much weaker overall if not defunct. show that these effects are robust.
Having identified and discussed the financial disintermediation due to deposit rate ceilings and their effects on monetary transmission, I now turn to a more detailed analysis of the role of individual bank characteristics in that process. Notice no new regressions are reported, the next results tables merely focus on different sets of parameters related to different bank characteristics. 
Bank Size Matters -Casting a Shadow on Banking?
First, focus on the parameter estimates related to bank size, that is the normalized assets of a banks' balance sheet. Table 4 displays all estimates related to bank size. For convenience, the direct impact of monetary policy from table 3 is reiterated in row (1).
Larger institutions have smaller lending growth (row 2), respond more strongly to policy (row 3), and have a more cyclically sensitive loan portfolio (row 4 and 5). Macroeconomic interactions indicate a positive lending growth cyclicality with respect to real activity (row 4), and somewhat looser evidence for positive bank level growth cyclicality with respect to nominal factors (row 5). Significant evidence for stronger nominal loan procyclicality of larger banks is only present in specifications that control for Regulation Q effects. According to row (6) Regulation Q seems to have a negative effect on the mean lending growth of larger banks. Structural breaks regarding the role of bank size in transmission from monetary policy to lending growth (rows 7 and 8), rather than structural breaks in the level of lending growth (row 6) suggest that bank size helped mitigate Regulation Q effects in specification (4). This may be due to that fact that larger banks were better able to attract (or were early innovators of) alternative unregulated non-deposit sources of funding. These effects are not merely due to larger banks being able to tab non-depository funding in general, as this is already captured by row 3.
Bank Capitalization
Let us turn to bank capitalization's impact on monetary transmission and differentials in rate ceilings impacts. Coefficient estimates related to capitalization from specifications (1) to (4) are displayed in table 5. Kishan and Opiela (2000) find a shielding effects on banks that are better capitalized, and my estimates confirm that better capitalized banks are in fact shielded from rate ceiling effects, see row 7. On the other hand, lending growth is less procyclical for better capitalized banks. According to row 4, a bank one standard deviation above the quarterly mean has a loan portfolio that is less procyclical by between 0.02 and 0.06 percentage points in response to a one percentage point growth in real GDP. If interactions between nominal and real factors and bank capital were omitted some of these effects would show up in the policy capital interaction with an interpretation of having a shielding effect from bank capitalization.
This highlights why it is important to control for loan demand heterogeneity across bank characteristics.
Bank Liquidity -Cash and Security Holding
Many previous empirical bank level studies did not treat cash and securities holdings separately, but combined them into a liquidity category serving as a liquidity buffer to shield against monetary contractions . However, more recent interpretations that contrast money market mutual funds with banks as "patient fixed income investors" (Hanson et al., 2014) point out that bank securities portfolios do not seem to be precautionary liquidity buffers and thus should be treated separately from cash.
Estimated coefficients related to the cash position of an individual bank are displayed in table 6, estimates related to security holdings in table 7. Again, the first rows in either of the tables shows estimates of the direct lending growth responses to policy.
Lending by banks with greater securities and cash holdings is more procyclical with respect to nominal factors (row 5 in tables 6 and 7). Yet, the real procyclicality differs. Banks with more cash hold a more procyclical portfolio than the average bank (row 4 in tables 6), whereas banks with greater security holdings hold a less procyclical portfolio (row 4 in tables 7).
Mean lending growth is lower for banks holding more cash and for banks holding more securities. Cash-rich bank, that is banks one standard deviation above the quarterly sample mean cash-to-asset ratio have a lower lending growth of between 0.62 and 0.64 percentage points. Similarly, banks that are one standard devation above the quarterly sample mean securities-to-asset ratio on average grow their lending by 0.39 percentage points less. The monetary policy response, especially at the Regulation Q kink, is more muted for both cash and securities holdings (row 7 of tables 6 and 7). That is higher cash and security holdings unambiguously shielded commercial banks' credit growth from deposit rate ceiling effects.
This might be one of the reasons that the cross-section of banks had greater proportional cash holdings during that period, as figure 11 suggests.
Conclusion
I use bank level data to explore the question of how deposit deregulation affected the mon- One interpretation of these findings is in terms of the contributions of monetary transmission to the Great Moderation corroborating previous aggregate work by Mertens (2008) at the micro level. In terms of policy implications, the findings of this paper cast doubt on the "divine coincidence", whether the output gap is a sufficient statistic for economic imbalances and whether "good policy" may be characterized by simple stabilizing policy rules as in Taylor (1993) and Orphanides (2003) . Tradeoffs could be more refined when nominal frictions are not the major source of (intertemporal) inefficiency (Stein, 2012; Sheedy, 2014) . Optimal policy may take into account the underlying (time-varying) transmission mechanism as documented in aggregate data by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and financial imbalances such as credit spreads or credit volumes (Curdia and Woodford, 2010) . Timberlake, R. (1985) . 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 Annualized Growth in Core Deposits (left axis) (1959-2013) 1959 Q4 1962 Q4 1965 Q4 1968 Q4 1971 Q4 1974 Q4 1977 Q4 1980 Q4 1983 Q4 1986 Q4 1989 Q4 1992 Q4 1995 Q4 1998 Q4 2001 Q4 2004 Q4 2007 Q4 2010 Q4 1959 Q4 1962 Q4 1965 Q4 1968 Q4 1971 Q4 1974 Q4 1977 Q4 1980 Q4 1983 Q4 1986 Q4 1989 Q4 1992 Q4 1995 Q4 1998 Q4 2001 Q4 2004 Q4 2007 Q4 2010 Q4 (b) 1959-1965 Q4 1960 Q1 1961 Q1 1962 Q1 1963 Q1 1964 Q1 1965 Q1   Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q2  Q3  Q4 1960 Q1 1961 Q1 1962 Q1 1963 Q1 1964 Q1 1965 Q1 (c) 1966-1970 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  1966 Q4  1967 Q4  1968 Q4  1969 Q4  1970 Q4   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2 Q3 1966 Q4 1967 Q4 1968 Q4 1969 Q4 1970 Q4 (d) 1971-1975 Q3 1971 Q4 1972 Q4 1973 Q4 1974 Q4 1975 Q4   Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q1  Q2 Q3 1971 Q4 1972 Q4 1973 Q4 1974 Q4 1975 Q4 Tables   Table 2: Bank Characteristics, 1960 Q4 -2010 Q4 1960 Q4 1970 Q4 1980 Q4 1990 Q4 2000 Q4 2010 No of Observations 12, 958 13, 317 14, 199 11, 450 7, 859 6, 197 The following are highlights of the act:
1. mandatory reserve requirements that banks keep in noninterest earning accounts at Federal Reserve Banks were lowered. State chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, as well as thrift institutions, were required to maintain reserve account balances. Mandatory reserves for all depository institutions were phased in over an eight-year period ending in 1988.
2. Federal Reserve Banks were required to begin charging banks for clearing checks through 1 November 1978 CBs authorized to offer ATS accounts, allowing funds to be transferred automatically from savings to checking accounts as needed to avoid overdrafts. The ceiling rate on ATS accounts was set at 5.25 percent, the same as the ceiling rate on regular savings accounts at CBs.
1 July 1979 SSCs established with no minimum denomination, maturity of 30 months or more and floating ceiling rates based on the yield on 2 1/2-year Treasury securities, but 25 basis points higher at S&Ls and MSBs. Maximums of 11.75 percent at CBs and 11 percent at S&Ls and MSBs. 1 May 1982 New time deposit created with no interest rate ceiling, no minimum denomination and an initial minimum maturity of 3-1/2 years.
New short-term deposit instrument created with $7,500 minimum denomination and 91-day maturity. The floating ceiling rate is equal to the discount yield on 91-day Treasury bills for S&Ls and MSBs, 25 basis points less for CBs. Maturity range of SSCs adjusted to 30-42 months.
1 September 1982 New deposit account created with a minimum denominatino of $20,000 and maturity of 7 to 31 days. The floating ceiling rate is equal to the discount yield on 91-day Treasury bills for S&Ls and MSBs, 25 basis points less for CBs. These ceiling rates are suspended if the 91-day Treasury bill rate falls below 9 percent for four consecutive Treasury bill auctions.
14 December 1982 MMDAs authorized with minimum balance of not less than $2,500, no interest ceiling, no minimum maturity, up to six transfers per month (no more than three by draft), and unlimited withdrawals by mail, messenger or in person 5 January 1983 Super NOW accounts authorized with same features as the MMDAs, except that unlimited transfers are permitted.
Interest rate ceiling eliminated and minimum denomination reduced to $2,500 on 7-and 31-day accounts. Minimum denomination reduced to $2,500 on 91-day accounts and MMCs of less than $100,000.
1 April 1983 Minimum maturity of SSCs reduced to 18 months.
1 October 1983 All interest rate ceilings eliminated except those on passbook savings and regular NOW accounts. Minimum denominations of $2,500 established for time deposits with maturities of 31 days or less (below this minimum, passbook savings rates apply.
1 January 1984 Rate differential between commercial banks and thrifts on passbook savings accounts and 7-to 31-day time deposits of less than $2,500 eliminated. All depository institutions may pay a maximum of 5.50 percent.
1 January 1985 Minimum denominations on MMDAs, Super NOWs and 7-to 31-day ceiling free time deposits reduced to $1,000.
1 January 1986 Minimum denominations on MMDAs, Super NOWs and 7-to 31-day ceiling free time deposits eliminated.
31 March 1986 All interest rate ceilings eliminated, except or the requirement that no interest he paid on demand deposits. Lending Volume
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